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DIVIDENDS FROM WASTING ASSETS CORPORATIONS
"Logic supplies a probability, but it is not remorseless."' In
no field of the law is the statement more true than in corporation
finance. Particularly as to corporate dividends, business practice
and accounting methods frequently displace logical deductions from
statutory language. Few topics are so commonly a matter between
directors and their counsel as the legality of a suggested dividend;
yet rarely is the profession able to furnish a definite opinion.2 The
problem becomes even more complicated when the charter provides
for participating preferred stock or non-cumulative preferred, for
income bonds or hybrid securities of a similar sort.' Indeed, the
'WILLISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW (1929) 157.
- Weiner and Bonbright, Anglo-Anerican Dividend Law: Surplus and Profit
(1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 954, 984.
3 Note (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 907.
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articles of the present-day corporation are as wearisome in their
puzzling stock classifications, embracing manifold dividend pref-
erences along with limited voting rights, as an Austinian treatise
on jurisprudence." Recent enactment by the West Virginia legis-
lature of an amendment authorizing dividends from wasting assets
corporations has now in part at least clarified the legal situation as
to local corporation 5
Historically, the commercial theory of dividends is of relative-
ly recent growth. The seventeenth-century trading corporations
contemplated merely a temporary investment of capital, - not a
permanent one. Issues of stock were floated so that a specific en-
terprise might be carried through; thereafter, within a very few
years, the bulk of the stock was always retired and the shareholders
paid off. Only gradually did the notion develop that a capital con-
tribution need not be repaid to the business associate, but might
remain as a permanent fixed investment.8 When, upon reorganiza-
tion of the East India Company in 1702, the new concern issued
shares representing a permanent issue of stock with definite par
value, the concept of fixed capital became established in early cor-
porate practice. During the eighteenth century, with the institu-
tion of stock certificates, investors soon came to think in terms of
dividends instead of considering as of primary importance the early
repayment of sums advanced. Nevertheless, despite this modern
thought of the contributor as having a stake in the business unit,
a distinction between fixed capital and floating capital has per-
sisted in English "dividends law" down to the present, simply as
an historical survival from the time of the trading companies.7
4 GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909) § 14: "This is the great
merit of Austin. His style is inexpressibly wearisome. He himself once ex-
pressed a doubt whether his love-letters were not written in the fashion of an
equity draughtsman; and certainly his treatise resembles in manner more the
charging part of an old bill in equity than any other hind of human com-
position."
5 W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 24, passed March 9, 1935, in effect ninety days from
passage; the amendment has now become W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 31, art.
1, § 70, second paragraph. The text is as follows: "Subject to any restrictions
in its charter, the directors of any corporation engaged in the exploitation of
wasting assets may determine the net profits derived from the exploitation of
such wasting assets without taking into consideration the deplqtioli of such
assets resulting from lapse of time or from necessary consumption of such
assets incidental to their exploitation."
oBerle, Origin of Ainerican Corporation Law 71, 81, REPORT OF COmMITTEE
ON OHIO CoRPORATION LAw OF OHIO STATE BAR AssocrATIoN (January 16,
1928).
7 PALMER, COMPANY LIw (13th ed. 1929) 226; cf. Dovey v. Cory, 1901 A.
C. 477, 487, per Halsbury, L. C.: III desiie, as I have said, not to express any
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Fortunately, such an artificial differentiation of capital assets has
never been received over into American jurisdictions :" if the vexa-
tious issue of capital replacement serves to confuse American courts,
no assistance can be had from English ease-law on the point. Eng-
lish and American theories of corporation law thus sharply diverge
on the relation of capital to dividends.
In America, the declaration of dividends is almost always a
matter of statutory permission: the lawyer must look to the precise
language of the local code, in order to ascertain the legal wisdom
of the proposed distribution. More often than not, decisions from
other states are of little help, where these are based on wholly dif-
ferent enactments.' Again, the particular provision of the act
may ambiguously use the terms capital and capital stock inter-
changeably,1" thus rendering extremely important the existence of
capital losses through depreciation 1 or depletion.'2 Usually one
finds that various statutory tests have been promulgated, such as
those forbidding dividends promoting insolvency, or dividends
diminishing the amount of capital, and requiring dividends to be
declared only from net profits. In some states, perhaps only one
of such limitations may be found; in others, these may all co-exist
and sometimes conflict, along with additional safeguards skill-
fully or unskillfully devised by the legislature." It is not unwise
to generalize that no aspect of American corporation law is more
unsatisfactory than the dividends sections of the codes.' 4
opinion, but as an illustration of what difficulties may arise the example given
by the learned counsel of one ship being lost out of a considerable number,
and the question whether all dividends must be stopped until the value of that
lost ship is made good out of the further earnings of the company or partner-
ship, is one which one would have to deal with."
a Wittenberg v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co., 15 Del. Ch. 147, 156, 133 Atl.
48, 52 (1926).
9 Weiner, Theory of AngZo-American Dividend Law: American Statutes and
Cases (1929) 29 COL. L. Rsv. 461, 462.
1o Weiner, op. cit. supra n. 9, at 467; see Note (1927) 75 U. or PA. L. REV.
350, 356: ".. . the inference is justifiable that the safeguard afforded the
stockholder, preferred as to capital, extends to the actual capital of the com-
pany, whatever the court decides that capital to be, whether it is merely the
actual invested capital originally paid in for shares as capital, or is the par
value of all outstanding shares."
ii Vogtman v. Merchants' Mortgage & Credit Co., 178 Atl. 99 (Del. Ch.
1935).
12 Under the income tax provision of the federal revenue acts, an amount
may be deducted from operating income for depletion.
13 Weiner, op. cit. supra n. 9.
14 For example, in the REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON OHIO CORPORATION LAW o
OHIO STATE BAR AssociATioN (September 18, 1928), it is stated that the
3
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Until a decade ago, the question of dividends from wasting
assets corporations had scarcely received legislative consideration."
The issue was thus a matter simply of statutory interpretation.
Two possible courses-were available to the courts. On the one
hand, the statutory prohibition against dividends out of capital
might be construed to mean exactly what the language said, -
namely, no dividends out of capital. In other words, employing
the test of the "single plain meaning","" declarations of such divi-
dends would in most instances be illegal. On the other hand, it
might be decided that there was a well-recognized exception "es-
tablished by the common law'" and engrafted upon the pertinent
statutory law""' sanctioning these dividends, even though the cap-
ital of the wasting assets corporation might thereby be impaired.
Employing this approach, the court could hold the common-law
exception supplemented and even superseded the legislative pro-
hibition, so that in the instance of wasting assets the statute did
not mean what it said. 9 Thus, the investor might obtain a return
of his capital at once, without waiting for dissolution or going
through the complicated process of statutory reduction of capital-
ization.'0 The only difficulty with thls second line of reasoning
was that it pre-supposed a common law of dividends: in the United
States, the contrary has generally been assumed. In short, such a
common-law exception to a clear statutory rule might almost seem
to be a square peg in a round hole. Logically, the doctrine would
thus be an indefensible one.
Curiously enough, the theory of the legality of dividends from
wasting assets corporations is barely a half century old, with deci-
sions from only a few scattered jurisdictions. In 1886, Victor Mora-
wetz discussed the problem for the first time, in his treatise on
Private Corporations." After stating that the whole capital
dividends section is the most widely criticized provision of the new Ohio Cor-
poration Code.
'5 The first such act was the Delaware law of 1927. By the term wasting
assets is meant not only that class of properties which may be consumed, such
as timber reserves, mines and oil wells, but also the type which expires by lapse
of time, such as leaseholds and patents.
16 See Hardman, A Problem in Interpretation (1936) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 110.
17 STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) 396; Federal Mining & Smelting Co. v.
Wittenberg, 15 Del. Ch. 409, 417, 138 At]. 347, 351 (1927).
is Federal Mining & Smelting Co. v. Wittenberg, .supra n. 17.
'5 Of. Bee v. Huntington, 114 W. Va. 40, 46, 171 S. E. 539, 542 (1933).
2oW. VA. RV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 13(a).
21 MoR wETz, A. TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed.
1886) § 442.
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originally contributed by the shareholders should be put into the
business and kept there, - and that no part of it should be taken
out again, directly or indirectly, and given back to the shareholders,
- the author then laid down a different rule applicable to mining
companies. When dealing with a corporation whose sole purpose
was to invest its capital in a specific piece of property like a mine,
in order to consume the property or extract its value at a profit, Mr.
Morawetz said that its dividends were both legal and within the
contemplation of the corporate charter. It was to be implied from
the character of the speculation of a mining company that the in-
come derived from working the mine should be distributed among
the shareholders as dividends, after deducting the expenses and
making reasonable provision for contingencies. No authorities,
however, were cited for such a novel proposition.
Almost contemporaneously, the leading case of Lee v.
Neuchatel Asphalte Company22 was decided by the Court of Ap-
peal in England. In that litigation, a minority shareholder sought
to enjoin the distribution of a dividend by an asphalt company, on
the ground that the concession held by the company was a wasting
asset, which had during the years become depreciated both by
lapse of time and by exhaustion of the subject-matter. Since no
sinking fund had been set apart to meet such depreciation in the
value of this wasting property, the plaintiff claimed the dividend
was being paid out of capital. At the trial, the proof showed that
the company's existing concession was for a longer period, ex-
tended over a wider area, and was held on more favorable terms
than the original grant to the company upon its organization.
Moreover, there was no probability that the entire amount of as-
phalt available for extraction could possibly be gotten out, even
during the life of the later concession. In these circumstances, it
was impossible for the plaintiff to establish that there had in fact
been capital loss, nor that there would be actually a diminishing
of capital through the distribution of dividends: hence, the court
refused relief. The Neuclatel Asphalte case has been widely cited.
on both sides of the Atlantic, as establishing the common-law
principle favoring dividends from wasting assets corporations. Yet
it is pertinent to note that no statute was involved; moreover, the
old distinction between fixed capital and floating capital was once
more before an English court. The decision can hardly be con-
22 Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Co., 41 Ch. D. 1 (1889).
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sidered as being applicable in this country, or even as having per-
suasive weight except on its precise facts,- namely, where a
wasting assets corporation, whose properties have increased in
value, distributes its income as dividends, in the absence of a
statute forbidding dividends from capital. In any event, later
English judicial utterance 23 have severely limited the scope of
the Neuchatel doctrine. Its present legal significance has been
summarized by Farwell, L.J. :24
"In my opinion that is not the true result of the decision;
the company's assets were larger than at its formation, and
the Court decided nothing more than the particular proposition
that some companies with wasting assets need have no depre-
ciation fund. For instance, I cannot think that it would be
right for the defendant company to purchase out of capital
the last two or three years of a valuable patent and distribute
the whole of the receipts in respect thereof as profits without
replacing capital expended in the purchase."
While presumably the issue has constantly been before cor-
porate managers in this country, the case-law on the point is
amazingly scarce. Furthermore, most of the cases cited in support
of the wasting asset doctrine are either mere dicta, or else are not
concerned with the problem of dividends. In Excelsior Mining
Company v. Pierce,25 the California court held that, after deduct-
ing the gross outlay of a mining company from its gross receipts,
the balance would be the legitimate subject of a dividend: the
statement was pure dictum, wholly unnecessary to the decision.
People v. Roberts2" involved the meaning of "capital stock em-
ployed in the state", as used in the New York Franchise Tax law;
it was decided that surplus earnings of a mining company were
not taxable as "capital", since the directors were not required to
establish a depletion reserve. Similarly, Boothe v. Summit Coat
Mining Company217 had to do with the word "profits" as used in
an agreement to purchase stock: its analogy for dividends pur-
poses seems somewhat far-fetched. Perhaps the strongest single
American authority is that of Mellon v. Mississippi Wire Glass
23 PAL-MER, COMPANY LAW (13th ed. 1929) 227-228.
24 Bond v. Barrow Haematite Co., (1902) 1 Ch. 353, 367-368. The learned
judge added: "It is for the Court to determine in each case on evidence
whether the particular company ought, or ought not, to have such a fund."
25 90 Cal. 131, 27 Pac. 44 (1891).
26 156 N. Y. 585, 51N. B. -293 (1898).
27 55 Wash. 167, 104 Pac. 207 (1909).
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Company,28 in which a preferred stockholder sought to compel the
maintenance of a sinking fund for the benefit of the preferred
stock, prior to the declaration of dividends on the common stock.
There was nothing in the corporate articles sanctioning the estab-
lishment of such a sinking fund, so that the court was being asked
by the complainant to make a new contract between the parties.
Under these conditions, the vice-chancellor ruled that there was
no power in the court to accord the relief sought. It will be noted,
however, that the question presented was the creation of the sink-
ing fund: the theory of the bill was not the enjoining of the
dividends as disbursements of capital. More important, it did not
appear that there was any deficit in capital assets even after
making a reasonable allowance for depletion. Other decisions
such as Van Vleet v. Evangeline Oil Company,9 - involving a
stockholder's petition for the appointment of a receiver on the
ground of mismanagement,- and Stratton's Independence, Ltd.
v. Howbert," having to do with the deduction of depletion in in-
come tax returns, - are all distinguishable. Per contra, it has been
held that a coal mining company may establish a sinking fund for
eventual redemption of its stock, despite objection from its
minority stockholders.3' Moreover, when dividends are actually
paid by a wasting assets corporation, the life tenant under a trust
will be allowed only a fair rate of interest.32 Thus, by and large,
American case-law has scarcely been convincing as to the legality
of such dividends. No doubt courts were reluctant to sanction the
establishment of such a doctrine, thought by many to be eco-
nomically unsound 3 and opposed both to the spirit and letter of
dividends statutes.
A few years back, Wittenberg v. Federal Mining and Smelt-
ing Company3 4 summed up the common-law position in this coun-
try. A preferred shareholder sued to enjoin the payment of a de-
28 77 N. J. Eq. 498, 78 Atl. 710 (1910).
29 129 La. 406, 56 So. 343 (1911).
30 207 Fed. 419. (1912); aff'd on other grounds, 231 U. S. 399, 34 St. Ct.
136 (1913).
3' Ford v. Locust Mountain Coal & I. Co., (1868) 25 Phila. Leg. Int. (Pa.)
268.
32 In re Wells, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174 (1913).
33 Comment (1926) 40 HARV. L. REv. 318. Obviously, however, whether the
doctrine is or is not economically unsound will depend upon the mineral wealth
of the jurisdiction in which it is applied.
34 Wittenberg v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co., 15 Del. Ch. 147, 156, 133
Atl. 48, 52 (1926); Federal Mining & Smelting Co. v. Wittenberg, 15 Del. Ch.
409, 417, 138 Atl. 347, 351 (1927).
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elared dividend which, it was alleged, would reduce the assets of
the corporation below the amount necessary to pay off the pre-
ferred stock on a distribution. The dividend was to be distributed
from profits for one particular year, without deduction for de-
pletion of assets. Both the chancellor and the Supreme Court of
Delaware refused to admit the validity of the wasting assets doc-
trine, at least in such a case as was there presented.3" It may fair-
ly be said that the purport of the Wittenberg decisions was
definitely opposed to the statements of American text-writers and
the dicta in American cases approving such dividends.
Following the Wittenberg decision, corporate counsel realized
as never before the necessity for specific statutory authorization of
wasting assets dividends. Accordingly, a carefully drawn act was
adopted by the legislature of Delaware,"' enabling the Chancellor
to refuse relief in his final disposition of the Wittenberg litigation.
Shortly thereafter, Ohio adopted a somewhat similar statute,"7 the
language of which was carried over by the drafters into the Uni-
form Business Corporation Act.3 8 The recent West Virginia statute
follows the Delaware phraseology, but unfortunately omits the
very salutary provision for establishment of a reserve fund for
depletion purposes.
What then is the situation in West Virginia to-day as to divi-
dends from wasting assets corporations? Presumably, in the ab-
sence of the 1935 statute, such a dividend would have been im-
proper, both from the angle of sound accounting practice and in
the light of the West Virginia statutes involved. In this con-
nection, the best accounting authority has taken the position that
such dividends are to be regarded as a payment in part out of
profits and in part out of capital.3 9 American courts confronted
with the problem have hardly dared to be so frank, when dealing
with statutes expressly forbidding distributions out of capital:
otherwise, violations of the law would thus have been sanctioned.
It is not unreasonable, therefore, to view the new West Virginia
act as one enacted in derogation of the common law. Yet the
change has unquestionably been a desirable one, having regard
3 In this litigation, there were two classes of stock. The preferred stock
was entitled to preference in the distribution of capital, upon dissolution of the
corporation.
36 Del. Laws 1927, c. 85, § 34.
37OHio GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 8623-38. The section was amended
slightly in 1929.
38 UNIFORM Busnmss CORPORATIO ACT (1928) § 24, VII.
39 BATrnw, AccouNTNG (1928) 279.
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especially to the coal industry and to the extensive oil and gas
fields in this state. Mining companies here more commonly have
but one class of stock, so that any question of preference in capital
distribution becomes largely academic. The new law then merely
approves a course of corporate conduct which has probably existed
locally for years, even despite express code provisions. 0
Viewed in this background of common law and local economic
conditions, the specific provisions of the 1935 amendment deserve
careful consideration. To begin with, the wasting assets doctrine
is enacted in explicit language, but subject to any restrictions that
may be contained in a corporate charter. In other words, by
erecting a corporate structure with two or more classes of stock,
with provisos for preference in distribution of capital upon dis-
solution, the shareholders may expressly or impliedly contract out
of the benefits of the new section. It is next important to note that
the decision as to the declaration of dividends in the ordinary
wasting assets corporation is left to the discretion of the directors.
Thus, their conduct continues to lie within the field of non-review-
able directorate action, so long as the directors decide prudently
and in good faith to permit or to withhold a distribution of profits.
Obviously, this salutary practice of confiding the decision to the
lireetors, as in the instance of an ordinary business unit, makes
for efficient corporate management. Furthermore, the newly-added
section wisely fails to limit by specific language the type of corpor-
ation within its purview. It has been left to West Virginia courts
to determine whether or not a particular corporation is "engaged
in the exploitation of wasting assets": thus, by sound process of
trial and error, judicial experience may extend or restrict the ap-
plication of the statute. Finally, only net profits derived from the
exploitation of wasting assets fall within the rule. Hence, if a
mining company or an oil or gas enterprise derive revenues from
corporate activities other than simply the extraction of minerals,
the usual provisions against dividends out of capital will apply as
to those specific activities.
It must. not be concluded from the foregoing discussion that
the wasting assets doctrine has now no other limitations in West
Virginia. On the contrary, the directors are still forbidden to de-
clare and pay a dividend when the corporation is insolvent, - or
40 Most small mining corporations in West Virginia have in the past dis-
tributed profits, without regard to considerations of the wasting assets doc-
trine.
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any dividend the payment of which would render it insolvent.
Similarly, as pointed out above, the discretion of the directors may
be at least impliedly restricted by the detailed classification of
stocks involved in the corporate structure. Moreover, the wasting
assets doctrine has until now been confined to mines and timber
reserves in their natural state, prior to their exploitation. 41 If the
timber or the product of the mine is reduced to possession and put
into storage, some courts haye treated the product as a current
asset, the depletion of which must be made good before computing
distributable profits.42 The distinction in this regard has arisen
from the classification of corporate properties into fixed and cur-
rent assets, - perhaps an unwarranted classification by accountants
and courts. Yet, assuming such distinction, coal in a mine might
be classed as a current asset, while the mineral in storage might
well become a fixed asset, outside of the wasting assets principle.
These and other similar problems remain for West Virginia
courts to solve. Meantime, in thfe application of the wasting assets
doctrine, it is important to bear in mind thab "the desirability of
rules of law obviously depends on how they work." The caveat
should be that "it is infrequently better to make business custom
follow the law than to seek to apply the opposite method."
4
C. C. WILLIAMS, JR.
4' Weiner and Bonbright, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law: wur-
plus and Profits (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 330, 339-340.
42 Van Vleet v. Evangeline Oil Co., 129 La. 406, 56 So. 343 (1911).
43 W ISTON, op. cit. msupra n. 1, 150.
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